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Maintenance Program: Making It More Palatable to
"Coerced" Participants
Ora Fred Harris, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Clean air is vital to the continued existence of humankind. To further
this significant interest, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (hereinafter
the Act) which, through the concept of cooperative federalism, seeks to
attain compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards prom-
ulgated for each critical or criteria air pollutant.' To be sure, this goal
has not been fully achieved. In fact, a number of air quality control
regions remain mired in nonattainment status and have experienced
Copyright 1989, by LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. The Clean Air Act is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp.
1986). The effort to bring about clean air in this country is longstanding and reflects
some federal involvement as early as 1953. But the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 ushered
in a significant federal presence in the field of air pollution control. These amendments
were designed "to assure that the air throughout the country 'is wholesome once again."'
See Note, State Implementation Plans Under the Clean Air Act: Continued Enforceability
As Federal Law After State Court Invalidation on State Grounds, 19 Val. U.L. Rev.
877, 881 (1985).
The statutory framework underlying the concept of cooperative federalism is embodied
in § 108(a)(l) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(b) & (a) (1982 & Supp. 1986), which calls
for the Federal Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] to establish National
Ambient Air Quality Standards [hereinafter NAAQS] for critical air pollutants to maintain
the public health (primary standards) § 109(b)(l) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982
& Supp. 1986) and to maintain the public welfare (secondary standards) § 109(b)(2) of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Once such standards are promulgated,
states assume the primary responsibility of attaining such standards. The crucial process
used to achieve this end is the State Implementation Plan [hereinafter SIP] which is
promulgated by a state agency subject to approval by EPA. Section 110(a)(1) of the Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
Although the concept of cooperative federalism reflects an increase in the federal
government's authority, it remains the generally understood rule that "pollution control
is the 'primary responsibility of States and local governments."' New England Legal
Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425, 432 (D. Conn. 1979), citing 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3),
§ 101(a)(3) of the Act.
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varying difficulty in meeting the primary and secondary national stan-
dards. 2
Automobile emissions control plays an integral role in the attainment
of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. The rationale for this
phenomenon is fairly simple: automobile emissions implicate several
critical air pollutants. They are: nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide and ozone.3 Two of these pollutants-carbon monoxide and
ozone-are principal culprits in thwarting the goals of the Clean Air
Act, especially in urban areas with heavy concentrations of automobiles. 4
In fact, this particular problem was addressed by Congress in the 1977
amendments to the Act.'
In these Amendments, Congress provided that states, through their
State Implementation Plans (SIPs), could provide for the inspection and
maintenance of automobile emission control systems. 6 By so doing, states
could delay their attainment of the National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards until 1982.1 Furthermore, regarding carbon monoxide and ozone,
an extension was granted until December 31, 1987, provided several
conditions were met, including the implementation of an inspection and
2. See, e.g., EPA: Pollution May Be on Rise, USA Today, April 23, 1986, at 3A
(lists those cities with the greatest number of violations of the Clean Air Act) and Cone,
L.A. To E.P.A.: Don't Hold Your Breath: Despite the Clean Air Act's Year-End Deadline,
Los Angeles, and Many Other American Cities Still Suffer from Polluted Air, 72 Sierra
27 (1987).
3. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F.
Supp. 869, 873 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Three air pollutants-carbon monoxide, hydro
carbons [sic], and photo-chemical oxidants-are largely attributable to motor vehicle emis-
sions"). Ozone, a type of photo-chemical oxidant, is "a pollutant created when hydro-
carbons mix with nitrogen oxide, sunlight and heat." C-U Untouched by Chicago's Record
Ozone, Champaign-Urbana News Gazette, August 8, 1988, at A-3 [hereinafter C-U Un-
touched]. See also Battle, Transportation Controls Under the Clean Air Act-An Experience
in (Un)Cooperative Federalism, 15 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 9 (1980).
4. See Kocheisen, Reynolds Alerts Cities to Ozone, Carbon Monoxide Deadline, 10
Nation's Cities Weekly 14 (1987).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986), which provides for the attainment
of NAAQS for the critical air pollutants no later than December 31, 1982, except for
ozone and carbon monoxide in which compliance was extended until December 31, 1987.
However, when it became readily apparent that state and local governments would not
meet these standards at the prescribed time, Congress extended the compliance deadline
until August 31, 1988. See C-U Untouched, supra note 3, at A-3 ("[tlhe Deadline for
states to meet federal air quality standards expires at the end of the month"). Stanfield,
Punching at the Smog, National Journal, March 5, 1988, at 602 ("'ozone remains a
major problem').
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(G) (1982 & Supp. 1986). But there was no specific mandate
in the Act for such I/M programs in nonattainment plans. Yet, such programs were
implicitly authorized by § 172(b)(2) of the Act which directs that a state's revised SIP
shall "provide for the implementation of all reasonably available control measures as
expeditiously as practicable." 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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maintenance (I/M) program.' Thus, I/M programs are firmly entrenched
requirements of the Clean Air Act.
The longstanding existence of such I/M programs does not neces-
sarily reflect their successful implementation and enforcement. In fact,
a significant amount of resistance to this programmatic requirement has
surfaced over the years and has adversely affected its utility.9 There are
several underlying reasons for the seemingly widespread aversion to the
I/M program. They are: 1) an antipathy to federal intrusion in matters
considered to be of "state or local" concern; 2) a concern about the
costs attending such programs; and 3) a belief in the existing techno-
logical effectiveness and efficiency of most American and foreign made
automobiles. 0 As a consequence, political, economic, and social con-
siderations are closely connected in this area, which is symptomatic of
environmental issues generally."
The conjunction of these political, economic, and social factors in
opposition to I/M programs has been the impetus for frequent extensions
to and forgiveness of noncompliance with the deadlines delineated in
the Act. The most recent extension, for example, was from December
31, 1987 to August 31, 1988.12 It was fostered by congressional concern
about the societal effects that sanctions authorized by the Act would
have upon nonattainment air quality control regions. Those sanctions
creating the most consternation call for a loss of federal highway and/
or sewage treatment plant funds and/or a ban on construction of major
stationary sources. 3 These administrative sanctions or "sticks," if you
will, are designed to compel compliance with the Act, including the I/
M program requirements. Notwithstanding these ominous sanctions, non-
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(11)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1986). See also D. Currie, Air Pollution:
Federal Law and Analysis, 6-26 (1981) ("[Rlequirement of a vehicle-inspection program
is absolute ....").
9. See Reitze, Controlling Automotive Air Pollution Through Inspection and Main-
tenance Programs, 47 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 705, 720 (1979) and Illinois Institute of
Continuing Legal Education (IICLE), Environmental Law 2-22 (1983) (with 1988 supple-
ment) ("'I/M program' has been and continues to be particularly unpopular with the
states and the public and is the subject of some debate).
10. See Reitze, supra note 9, at 720, 721, 724, and 734.
11. See Gates, Environmental Law's Second Decade: How Are We Doing? 1987 Ark.
Law. 40, 41 ("most problems, and most solutions, are inextricably intertwined with a
variety of economic, social and political factors").
12. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-199 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Sunny Day for L.A. Called Step Closer with EPA Accord, L.A. Daily
Journal, Sept. 26, 1985, at 19 ("the Los Angeles basin does not stand a ghost of a
chance of cleaning its air by the federally-mandated deadline of 1987 and ... no one
wants the sort of punitive economic sanctions the EPA can impose on California for
failure to reach the deadline").
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attainment areas are still with us, 14 and I/M programs continue to attract
the wrath of much of the American public. 5 Because of this untenable
situation, some genuine thought must be given to developing a new
approach to environmental regulation in this area.
This Article explores those forms of regulatory policy that may
provide greater incentives for state and local governments to implement
and enforce I/M programs so as to make reasonable further progress
toward attainment and maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality
Standards. Typically, the federal regulatory focus underlying many en-
vironmental statutes has been on "command," "hammer," or so-called
"stick" methods of enforcement.' 6 Certainly, the enforcement provisions
of the I/M program mirror this approach. Very little consideration,
however, seems to have been given to a broad "carrot" or positive
incentive approach as an alternative method of implementation and
enforcement.' 7 in this Article, this alternative will be closely examined
and analyzed to determine its efficacy as an automobile emissions control
mechanism.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE
PROGRAMS
A. General Discussion
If one were in the midwestern United States during the oppressive
heat and drought conditions of the summer of 1988, the ominous nature
of ozone pollution would have been evident. For a few days during the
first week of July, an ozone yellow alert was in effect in Chicago
because of the interaction of factory and automobile emissions with the
unusually hot temperatures.'" At particularly high risk were individuals
14. See EPA Proposed Delay in Sanctions for Air Pollution, L.A. Daily Journal,
Nov. 18, 1987, at 1.
15. See Ostrov, Inspection and Maintenance of Automotive Pollution Controls: A
Decade-Long Struggle Among Congress, EPA and the States, 8 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. 139,
141 (1984) (Recalcitrance is apparent, although commentator casts best possible light on
public's acceptance of I/M programs.).
16. Train v. Nat'l Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64, 95 S. Ct. 1470, 1474
(1975) ("Congress reacted by taking a stick to the States in the form of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 .... ).
17. The unfortunate aspect of Congress' shortsightedness in adopting a "stick" ap-
proach as the dominant implementation method is the negative overtone that has been
created, particularly in connection with I/M programs. See, e.g., Ostrov, Inspection and
Maintenance of Automotive Pollution Controls: A Decade-Long Struggle Among Congress,
EPA and the States, supra note 15, at 141 ("Rather than changing the state governments'
attitudes toward I/M, the statutory revisions in some cases seemed to galvanize opposition
to such programs.").
18. See C-U Untouched, supra note 3, at A-3.
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with preexisting respiratory and cardiac problems. Moreover, each res-
ident of the city was jeopardized to some degree by the risks posed by
such unhealthy air quality.19
Perhaps those who were in Chicago and actually experienced the
trauma of trying to breathe "dirty" air could best appreciate the im-
portance of effective automobile emissions control as a means of at-
taining clean air. 20 Some may have even finally thought thatthe heretofore
dreaded inspection and maintenance program had some redeeming value
after all. Nevertheless, many persons probably remained unalterably
opposed to such programs as unwarranted intrusions on their lifestyles
with an inadequate corresponding return in enhanced air quality. 21 To
be sure, the causal relationship between the attainment of the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards and the implementation of a rigorous
I/M program is far from clear. Scientific evidence is not that illuminating
in this regard; this reflects that, once again, science has not been as
certain as we would like. 22
B. Public Opposition to I/M Programs
Quite frankly, the average American probably does not think about
I/M programs in terms of scientific uncertainty. Instead, the underpin-
nings of the apparently intense political and public disdain for such
programs are far removed from this consideration. For example, the
concept of federalism has been frequently adduced as a prime reason
for demurring to I/M programs. The average citizen tends to characterize
such programs as unwarranted intrusions into traditionally state or local
matters, namely the safety, inspection, and maintenance of automobiles.23
19. Id. ("EPA has issued 12 ozone advisories so far this year, urging people to limit
outdoor activity and physical exertion, especially individuals with heart and lung prob-
lems").
20. It is generally accepted that people better appreciate and respond to the risks of
pollution when these risks are specifically brought home to them. See Harris, Commu-
nicating the Hazards of Toxic Substance Exposure, 39 J. Legal Educ. 97, 102 (1989)
("Students learn (as do people in general) when the risk is specifically brought home to
them .... "). This would certainly be the case for those trying to cope personally with
the ozone alert. See Stanfield, supra note 5, at 601 ("Environmentalists have been able
to transform the air pollution debate into a public health issue.").
21. Reitze, supra note 9, at 736 ("I & M will add more costs in both dollars and
time. In light of these added costs, I & M makes little sense.").
22. See, e.g., Newcomb, The Seattle Automobile Inspection and Maintenance Pro-
gram: Multiple Analyses of Program Impact, 10 Evaluation Rev. 217, 227 (1986) (Although
tentative research findings reflected ."that the I/M program has had a negligible impact
on levels of CO at the two monitoring stations studied .... more conclusive findings
necessitated additional research at other monitoring stations.).
23. The resistance by the states and their residents is political in nature and is one
of the primary reasons for the lethargic development of I/M programs. Reitze, supra
note 9, at 720.
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Beyond this level of rationality, the federalism argument has been ar-
ticulated in more sophisticated, legalistic terms whenever the federal
government has threatened to impose sanctions upon a state for failing
to implement an I/M program.2 4 What seems to have eluded the attention
of the proponents of such arguments is that both the language and
legislative history of the Act seem to unequivocally support the federal
government's Xction in this regard.25 Moreover, the concept of "coop-
erative federalism" which undergirds the Act is invariably placed in
jeopardy whenever a state refuses to cooperate.2 6 Thus, sanctions of the
kind clearly delineated in the Act must be available to further its overall
objectives.2 7
Another remonstration centers on the issue of the costs associated
with I/M programs. In this regard, both financial and time costs are
implicated. Concerning financial costs, the usual argument is that the
expenses attendant to inspection of the automobile coupled with the
added repair costs in the event one fails an inspection are unduly severe.
2
1
24. For a thorough discussion of the multifaceted issues surrounding the implemen-
tation of I/M programs within our system of federalism, see Ostrov, supra note 15.
25. See Note, supra note 1, at 882. In support of the argument justifying expansive
federal power under the Clean Air Act, the commentator notes:
First, over the past three decades, federal authority in the field of air pollution
control has increased dramatically which the discretion of the States has been
cut back rather severely.
Second, the ultimate congressional purpose in passing the 1970 Amendments
was, and still is, to protect the public health and welfare by achieving specified
federal air quality standards.
26. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im-
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196 (1977) ("[Success of
federal programs has been gravely compromised by this dependence upon state and local
governments, whose generally poor record in controlling environmental deterioration trig-
gered the initial resort to federal legislation, and whose subsequent performance in the
context of federal programs has in many instances remained inadequate.").
27. Because cooperative federalism will sink of its own weight if one of the parties
to the compact refuses to cooperate, some enforcement mechanism is necessary to insure
that the cooperative federal-state regime remains viable. The sanctions found in the Act
(termination of federal highway funds, sewage treatment funds, and a ban on construction
of major stationary sources) work, in theory, toward this objective and, therefore, are
essential devices to "achieve acceptable air quality." Ostrov, supra note 15, at 139. See
also Battle, supra note 3, at 3 ("The task of the federal government, therefore, becomes
one of enticing or coercing the states to perform duties toward which they are themselves
disinclined-without running afoul of constitutional restrictions or a legislative backlash.").
28. But see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Report by the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 286
(1977), 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (91 Stat. 685) 1077 ("Consumer costs for
inspection and maintenance are offset in substantial measure by consumer savings associated
with fuel economy improvements resulting from maintenance."). Thus, a difference of
opinion exists as to whether the unavoidable costs associated with such I/M programs
are unreasonably high in view of the benefits.
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Moreover, the time or inconvenience factor associated with such activ-
ities, it is contended, is excessively burdensome.2 9 These costs, when
weighed in a cost-benefit ratio, have prompted some individuals to
conclude that I/M programs are not economically efficient.30
A final protest to such programs has been couched in terms of their
inutility in view of the technological efficiency of the current fleet of
new automobiles. In fact, the argument has been made that such pro-
grams are unnecessary because of the state of the art emission control
systems prevalent in today's models. 3 The technological effectiveness of
existing emission control systems, the reasoning goes, is capable of
insuring adequate air quality.3 2 But this argument tends to overlook the
fact that many of these systems can be compromised by unauthorized
tampering. 3 Certainly, an I/M program could detect such improper
action and insure that this advanced technology is actually operative.
The foregoing arguments against I/M programs reflect the intense
political fallout associated with the implementation and enforcement of
such programs. Is it politically palatable to force such programs upon
the public? It is perhaps fair to say that Congress and, to a lesser
degree, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA)
have not exhibited the requisite political courage to take stringent actions
against those who have adopted a cavalier attitude regarding compliance
with I/M requirements.34 In other words, it may be extremely painful
29. Reitze, supra note 9, at 734 ("Additional costs that an I & M program can entail
include time lost in having an inspection and difficulties related to quality control of
automotive repairs.").
30. Id. at 706 (Government should "forego" the expense of another expansion of
the federal bureaucracy by rejecting the implementation of I & M programs.).
31. Id. at 796 ("The diminishing need for the I & M program is a result of
technological advances in emissions control systems required by other provisions of the
Clean Air Act.").
32. Id. at 706. The commentator suggests that more meaningful automobile emission
control is achievable via "technological developments in engine design" instead of I/M
programs.
33. Though there are anti-tampering provisions contained in both the Clean Air Act
(42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986)) and in a few state laws, see, e.g., Cal.
Health & Safety Code, § 44017 (West 1986) and Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 23-202(c)(2)
(Supp. 1988), effective enforcement is dubious because violations are simply difficult to
detect. Perhaps an inspection and maintenance program could remedy this deficiency.
Reitze, supra note 9, at 713.
34. As one member of the California Assembly has observed concerning the efficacy
of sanctions available under the Clean Air Act: "I think you've got the threat but the
threat is not exercised. So I am not sure people regard it as a real threat. I think it's
important to keep that threat in place because without it you don't have the will."
Richardson, The Politics of Smog, California Journal 289 (June 1987), at 289. See also
Cleaner Air Will Require Courage, The Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 1, 1988, at 18A
[hereinafter Cleaner Air] ("Congress must summon its courage and tell the utilities, coal
companies, auto makers, petroleum refiners and others that the nation will clean up its
air."). (Emphasis in the original).
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from a political perspective to terminate federal highway or sewage
treatment funds and perhaps be even more difficult to order a ban on
construction of major stationary sources because of noncompliance with
a program that is perceived as not being highly regarded by a sizable
portion of the American people. 5
From an environmental perspective, this procrastination is of du-
bious, but admittedly uncertain, value. To be sure, the number of cities
and counties whose air quality fails to meet the national standards with
respect to carbon monoxide and ozone have escalated.16 A common
denominator for many of these areas is the high concentration of au-
tomobiles.3 7 Although uncertainty surrounds this issue, there is cogent
evidence that the internal combustion engine found in most automobiles
is a principal culprit of ambient air pollution in terms of nitrogen oxides,
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and ozone.3" Thus, it is no leap in
logic to conclude that excessive automobile emissions play a substantial
role in the diminution of the ambient air quality.
I/M programs are simply a recognized method of controlling these
harmful automobile-related pollutants. Congress acknowledged the pro-
gram's utility by providing for it in the Act.3 9 The EPA has in theory
accepted the notion that I/M programs can effectively achieve attainment
by at least threatening to impose sanctions against those communities
who refuse to implement such programs. 40 Of course, such programs
can never be the sole control mechanism; but it seems foolhardy not
35. Richardson, supra note 34, at 288. For example, this California official has
recently hypothesized "that imposing sanctions could have an opposite political effect
than intended-it could erode support for air pollution programs." But see Ostrov, supra
note 15, at 190 ("public ... support[s] the I/M" program; resistance is characterized as
being more directed towards the "federal directives" pertaining to the program instead
of their substance).
36. Arrandale, Air Pollution Countdown, 2 Congressional Quarterly's Editorial Re-
search Reports 618 (1987) ("Millions of Americans still are breathing polluted air. More
than 60 of this country's metropolitan areas, including most of its big cities, will miss a
Dec. 31 deadline ... on ozone and carbon monoxide.").
37. Id. ("Further progress may require drivers to use cleaner-burning fuels such as
gasohol-a blend of petroleum with ethanol, which is derived from corn-or abandon
their cars for commuter buses and trains in populous urban areas.").
38. Battle, supra note 3, at 9 ("Carbon Monoxide (CO), hydrocarbons (HC), and
nitrogen oxides (NO.) are the major pollutants emitted from vehicle tailpipes; and HC
and NO, combine with atmospheric oxygen in sunlight in complex chemical reactions to
form photochemical oxidants, or 'brown smog."').
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(ll)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
40. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533
F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (EPA remained dormant for several years before taking
any action to assure compliance with I/M program via consent decree), and Richardson,
supra note 34, at 289 (a general feeling of skepticism exists as to whether EPA sanctions
will ever be enforced given their discretionary nature and the political climate in which
the threats of such sanctions are made).
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to acknowledge their utility in the overall scheme of automobile emissions
controls. To the extent, therefore, that public recalcitrance continues to
stifle the utilization of I/M programs, the prospect of deleterious en-
vironmental effects becomes more ominous. Thus, a method to assuage
this resistance to I/M programs will certainly have significant environ-
mental consequences.
III. A SOLUTION OR SUGGESTED AVENUE TO RAPPROCHEMENT
A. General Discussion
An effective strategy must be developed to make the inspection and
maintenance program under the Act more palatable to the American
population. Astonishingly, such creative approaches are not currently
embodied within the Act.4 1 This has certainly prevented clean air from
becoming a reality.
As previously noted, the major enforcement mechanism under the
Act consists of sanctions designed to encourage compliance through fear
or intimidation. 42 But the Act does provide for the awarding of federal
grants to state agencies to promote research in developing methods to
control air pollution in order to attain and maintain National Ambient
Air Quality Standards 3. 4  It is transparent that the former approach
operates on the "stick" principle while the latter approximates the
"carrot" principle to behavioral modification. Which is more efficacious?
The answer to the foregoing question involves qualitative judgments
concerning the effectiveness of the use or threatened use of coercive
measures as compared to the prudent utilization of incentives to bring
about reasonable further progress toward attainment, particularly with
respect to fostering a more cooperative climate with regard to I/M
programs. To be sure, one thing is clear: the stick approach has not
worked very well in bringing about compliance with the Act, including
promoting the use of I/M programs to achieve that end." In fact, this
41. The only creative program within the Act to spur development of an I/M program
is found at § 210 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7544 (1982 & Supp. 1986), which provides,
in pertinent part, "The Administrator is authorized to make grants to appropriate State
agencies in an amount up to two-thirds of the cost of developing and maintaining effective
vehicle emission devices and systems inspection and control programs ......
42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(I) and 7503(4) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (ban on con-
struction of major stationary sources of pollution) and 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (1982 & Supp.
1986) (withhold federal highway and sewage treatment funds).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7544 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
44. See, e.g., Stanfield, supra note 5, at 602. The commentator underlined the fact
that the American Lung Association has conducted studies reflecting "that without the
additional pollution controls on autos and trucks, as provided by the pending clean air
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approach may have actually produced the opposite effect within the
populace. Some contend, for example, that a threatened termination of
highway funds or a ban on construction is fairly certain to instill an
element of defiance that greatly cripples the implementation of I/M
programs as well as any other form of automobile emissions control. 45
Much can be said of the notion that one possible way of riling an
American is for the federal government to threaten him or her about
something which is thought-rightly or wrongly-to come within his or
her personal domain.4 This appears to be exactly the case with regards
to implementing I/M programs in nonattainment areas through the
"stick" method.
In the affected community, as well as in state and city legislative
halls, cries of defiance have frequently been loud and clear. From this
has sprung indifference and, much too often, litigation regarding the
implementation of such programs. 47 Not only has this hindered the
fulfillment of the goals of the Act, but it has fostered economic inef-
ficiency because of the huge transaction costs involved. Thus, one must
seriously question whether the threat of "beating someone over the
head" has been an effective regulatory approach.
In view of the palpable shortcoming of the "stick" approach to
inspire compliance with the Act, it appears essential that there be some
shift to an incentive approach to engender an appropriate level of
environmentally conscious behavior. In other words, an alternative "Game
Plan" must be devised. Of course, if an acceptable game plan is de-
veloped, the effective execution of such a plan must be carefully con-
sidered.
The question of whether Congress should more generously use ec-
onomic incentives-market and otherwise-has arisen frequently in the
bills, ozone nonattainment areas will fail to meet the standard 'for the foreseeable future'
because of the growth of industry and the increased number of cars." The foregoing
conclusion is certainly not a ringing endorsement of the efficacy of the "stick" method
of enforcement.
45. See Ostrov, supra note 15, at 141 ("[S]tatutory revisions in some cases seemed
to galvanize opposition to such programs.").
46. A prime example of this phenomenon is the white resistance to court-ordered
school desegregation in the South primarily from the late 1950's through the 1970's and
subsequently in the North during the 1970's and 1980's. The Little Rock Central High
School Desegregation Crisis of 1957 is a classic illustration of such federally-inspired
defiance. See E. Huckaby, Crisis at Central High 39 (1980) ("[I]t was now Little Rock,
Arkansas, versus the United States of America.").
47. The most vivid illustration of the type of marathon litigation that has occasionally
surrounded the I/M implementation issue is Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1982), in which the initial litigation
was commenced in 1982 and, after several different actions, was concluded in 1985.
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context of environmental regulation. 4 Although the Act does utilize a
few incentives, this effort is far too feeble. And, as discussed previously,
these incentives are much too sparse to effectively eliminate nonattain-
ment air quality control regions.4 9 But the basic thesis of this Article
is that perhaps a meaningful package of incentives could serve as a
catalyst to a more tolerant, understanding attitude toward I/M programs.
Now then, what shbuld be the precise contours of such a program?
This thorny question is the focus of the remaining sections of this
Article.
B. The Game Plan
The existing incentive within the Act to extinguish nonattainment
conditions within air quality control regions, namely research grants,
can promote important environmental objectives with respect to im-
proving air quality. Increasing environmental controls through scientific
research simply enhances available methods of effective pollution con-
trol.5 0 But because of the constant difficulty posed by the scientific
uncertainty surrounding many of these issues, any scientific research
spawned by research grants cannot be viewed in a vacuum as the
48. See, e.g., Note, Legal Incentives for Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New
Approach to Hazardous Waste Management, 95 Yale L.J. 810, 812 (1986) (bemoans the
fact that neither Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) nor Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
(now Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)) contain sufficient
economic incentives to encourage waste reduction). See also Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat'l
Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 n.37, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2792 n.37 (1984)
("Economists have proposed that economic incentives be substituted for the cumbersome
administrative-legal framework."), quoting Lave and Omenn, Cleaning the Air: Reforming
the Clean Air Act 28 (1981).
49. The ineffectiveness of the incentives currently within the Act is graphically illus-
trated by the current state of nonattainment in this country which is periodically renewed
by the extension of the compliance deadlines. The most recent extension for carbon
monoxide and ozone expired on August 31, 1988, "the day when Congress must deal
with ozone pollution." Stanfield, supra note 5, at 600. But, since the moratorium deadline,
EPA has been compelled to resort "to its own devices" because of Congress' unwillingness
to deal with the air pollution problem. Cleaner Air, supra note 34, at 18A.
50. It is undeniable that scientific research can broaden the galaxy of effective en-
vironmental control devices. Striking examples are: (1) the development of the catalytic
converter which significantly reduces carbon monoxide (CO) emissions, converting them
into harmless carbon dioxide CO2) and water (H20); and (2) the development of gasohol
which, if mass produced and distributed, could significantly reduce automobile emissions.
See, e.g., Farmers Say, "Hurrah for Ethanol!", Successful Farming, Aug. 1988, at 23
(successfully used in the Denver area to improve air quality). But is there a limit to what
science can do?
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panacea.5" Thus, an incentive package must transcend the one currently
in the Act.
The difficulty rests, therefore, with carving out a transcendant in-
centive program in the face of scant judicial, legislative, and adminis-
trative guidance. In fact, there is virtually nothing concerning the use
of incentives to galvanize people into complying with the I/M program.,2
Thus, it appears that little, if any, meaningful th6ught has been given
to the complete utilization of incentives, as opposed to command and
control regulations, to enhance air quality in nonattainment areas."
Regarding implementation of the I/M program, the absence of an
incentive-based regulatory approach may be a crucial deficiency in the
nonattainment process and may partially explain why this program has
been frequently viewed as an anathema. 4 Dispelling this generally neg-
ative perception of I/M programs requires a novel marketing strategy
to emphasize their strengths to the general population. A package of
economic incentives-market and non-market-seems to be at least one
answer to this problem.
What should these incentives be? How should they be configured?
Market incentives first come to mind.55 Of these, tax incentives are
considered most often. 6 In the waste management area, for example,
51. Congress seemed to be cognizant of the limits of science by placing greater
emphasis on other "incentives," for better or for worse, like cutting off federal funds
or imposing bans on the construction of certain pollution sources.
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. The term "incentives," for purposes of this Article, means those devices that
induce one into doing something because of the prospect of reward and, therefore, engender
a positive feeling within the actor. An example of incentives in this sense would be tax
incentives like credits and/or deductions. But it appears that Congress, some courts and
a few commentators have taken a broader view of incentives and have categorized items
such as extensions to compliance deadlines and, most notably, sanctions in the Act-
denials of federal grants and bans on construction in the event of noncompliance-as
incentives to compliance. To be sure, these latter items may induce compliance but surely
not because of the extension of a "carrot." Instead, they epitomize the "stick" or
"disincentive" approach to behavioral modification.
54. Battle, supra note 3, at 2. In analyzing the myriad reasons why states refuse to
cooperate under the cooperative federalism concept, the commentator hypothesizes that
"[tihere may be insufficient incentives to entice the states to participate, as can occur
when the state is left with too few discretionary choices." Certainly, this is true of the
Clean Air Act generally and in connection with the I/M program specifically. That is,
there are just too few incentives (in the true sense of the word) to galvanize compliance.
Thus, recalcitrance becomes an ineluctable consequence.
55. "Market" incentives are those positive incentives irising within the marketplace
that, if doled out judiciously, can foster certain desired behavior.
56. The Internal Revenue Code has been often used as a tool for social or behavioral
change. A striking example are the tax breaks once extended to homeowners for engaging
in energy conservation practices. The ostensible objective of these tax incentives was to
reduce the wasteful use of energy. See Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92
Stat. 3174 (1978).
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Congress has been criticized for not looking to market incentives as
inducements for more effective waste management controls under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)1 7 The argument has
been advanced that such incentives would hasten the shift from waste
management to waste reduction, reuse, and recycling.58 In other words,
the avowed objective of RCRA-waste reduction-would become more
than mere idle words if market or economic incentives were extended
to generators, transporters, and disposers of solid and hazardous wastes
to reduce the volume of waste instead of simply trying to manage it
after generation.5 9
This thesis is probably relevant to the nonattainment aspect of the
Act, particularly in connection with automobile emissions control me-
chanisms like an I/M program. Is it not conceivable that providing
incentives, pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, to automobile owners
complying with directives under the I/M program would spur a more
successful program? For example, a tax credit or, at the very least, a
tax deduction for those whose automobiles successfully undergo inspec-
tion and testing will probably transform a defiant attitude into a com-
pliant one among such owners. In looking at this solution in terms of
the predictability or rationality of human behavior, the tax incentive
("a carrot") would provide a ready inducement for bringing the au-
tomobile emissions control program to its desired level of effectiveness.60
It seems that this approach would be markedly better than the prevailing
"stick" method.
When tax incentives are proposed to foster behavioral modification
concerning environmental matters, two issues arise: 1) will such action
place an undue strain on the United States Treasury and 2) will it open
the door to a myriad of other interest groups claiming a similar right
to such preferential tax treatment. 61
57. Note, supra note 48, at 814.
58. Id. at 813 (To the contrary, EPA "has created disincentives for waste reduction.").
59. Id. at 831.
60. The transparent advantage of a "carrot" approach involving tax incentives is that
recipients will likely respond with alacrity to its availability. This will surely militate in
favor of the successful utilization of I/M programs. The only legitimate question concerning
a tax incentive program is whether it should be worked out under the auspices of and
in conjunction with the states or whether it should be handled directly with individual
citizens. The former approach approximates more closely the notions of federalism em-
bodied within the Act. Because I/M programs are a part of the SIP and thus state law,
the state should enact the enabling legislation for such an incentive program. The latter
approach does not make any sense unless the federal government would actually run the
I/M program, a proposition which is of uncertain validity both constitutionally and
practically.
61. These are certainly legitimate subjects of concern given that the nation is currently
in the throes of a massive budget deficit with no meaningful abatement currently on the
horizon.
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Regarding the first concern, problems are presented in weighing the
economic costs of an activity against the correlative environmental ben-
efits. The difficulty rests not so much in determining the economic costs,
but in quantifying the corresponding environmental benefits. 62 More
precisely, how does one reduce such benefits to dollars and cents? The
only plausible method of accomplishing this end is to identify those
harms attributable to "dirty" air and then to determine the resulting
societal costs. In this connection, it should be noted that chronic and
acute health problems may result from air with unhealthy levels of
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides 3.6  The costs to
society of coping with these health problems are staggering. For example,
in the Los Angeles area alone, the costs have been placed at $13 billion. 64
When one assesses the environmental benefits of I/M programs in terms
of reducing these pollution costs, the cost/benefit ratio militates in favor
of such programs. To be sure, a plausible argument can be made that
the economic costs of I/M programs (even with tax incentives) may be
overshadowed by the ensuing environmental benefits. Because of this
favorable cost-benefit ratio, the addition of a tax incentive package
should not undermine efficiency and, more significantly, should not
unduly burden the federal government's coffers.
65
As to the second concern, the tax incentive program underlying the
I/M proposal will serve a distinctive function, namely to promote the
provision of a public good: clean air. Without clean air, society faces
significant health risks which threaten humankind's continued existence.
This preeminent interest, therefore, deserves such preferred tax treatment.
62. In the regulatory context, EPA has occasionally experienced some difficulty in
assessing the environmental benefits associated with a given regulation pursuant to its
statutory responsibility of determining the regulation's cost-effectiveness. See, e.g., Wey-
erhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (establishing industry-wide effluent
limitations under the Clean Water Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1987)).
63. Regarding hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, they can interact with atmospheric
oxygen and, in the presence of sunlight, form ozone. "Medical researchers have found
that ozone in the lower atmosphere can cause serious upper respiratory problems." Los
Angeles Faces Imminent Ban on Building New Tainting Plants, New York Times, Aug.
30, 1988, at 7A. "Carbon monoxide, which comes largely from vehicle exhaust, reduces
the ability of the body to absorb oxygen and can cause heart problems." Id.
64. See Patrol Is Welcome Sight Amid Smog, Los Angeles Journal, Aug. 31, 1988,
at 8.
65. In essence, a net savings should redound to the benefit of the federal treasury
in view of the sizable reduction in pollution-related health costs resulting from the enhanced
implementation of I/M programs arising from available tax incentives.
66. The provision of public goods is one of those desired goals, along with the
elimination of externalities, whose attainment will bring about an efficient level of pollution
control. Governmental intervention greatly facilitates the achievement of this objective.
R. Findley and D. Farber, Environmental Law: Cases and Materials 346 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter R. Findley and D. Farber, Cases and Materials].
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When couched in such terms, restricting the proposed economic tax
incentives to an I/M program is defensible. 67
It seems unwise to mortgage the environmental future of the nation
simply to save a few dollars today. This position has special appeal
because of the numerous quantifiable environmental benefits now as-
sociated with I/M programs. Using tax incentives to revitalize the I/M
program, therefore, makes eminently good sense from an environmental
policy perspective.
Alternatively, because the costs of inspection and, if necessary, of
repair to an automobile's emission control system have often been cited
as reasons underlying some of the widespread public discontent for I/
M programs, reimbursement for such compliance costs would probably
allay much of the opposition to the program.6 1 Congruent with the
behavioral rationale underlying the tax incentive proposals, such a pro-
gram of direct economic assistance would also have the positive effect
of leading one to conclude that he or she is being rewarded for assuming
the added responsibility of having an automobile tested and inspected
to determine if emission control standards are being met. In other words,
these incentives tend to make the citizen feel good about what he or
she is doing and, consequently, make it easier for such individual to
adhere to the environmental creed that he or she may openly espouse,
namely, in this instance, clean air. 69 To be sure, this is far different
from feeling that you have been hit over the head with a stick.
In addition to individual incentives, perhaps some group or gov-
ernmental incentive packages should be considered as an alternative to
the "stick" approach. For example, if state and local governments were
offered some federal "carrots" to hasten their efforts to make I/M
programs a reality, then much of the legislative and litigative resistance
could possibly be eliminated. What form should these incentives take?
67. It is exceedingly difficult to imagine a more important social goal than to clean
up the nation's air. For this reason, privileged treatment under the Internal Revenue Code
is eminently reasonable.
68. To maintain the concept of federalism already embodied in the Act, states should
be conduits for those federal reimbursements for compliance with the I/M program. There
is precedence for this arrangement in the myriad of social programs funded by the federal
government through the states. A notable example is the Federal Food Stamp Program.
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-30 (1988).
69. See, e.g., Portney, Reforming Environmental Regulation: Three Modest Proposals,
Issues in Science and Technology 74 (Winter, 1988) ("public concern about the environment
is still very high"). In view of this environmental attitude, a principal goal is to align
this positive belief with similar behavior. See Snyder, When Believing Means Doing:
Creating Links Between Attitudes and Behavior, from Zanna, Higgins, and Herman,
Consistency in Social Behavior, Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology
105 (2d ed. 1979).
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One possible answer to the incentive problem in this context is to
simply convert the existing disincentives into incentives. 70 That is, where
the federal government currently holds the threat of termination of
highway and sewage treatment funds over states as a Damoclean sword,
what if this threat were turned into an incentive package to foster
compliance. That is, if a supplemental level of federal funding for
highways and waste treatment plants were offered to those states that
were compliant with regard to I/M programs, then perhaps less recal-
citrance would be shown. Here again, allowing state and local govern-
ment officials to perceive the prospect of reward for their obedience
may instill the cooperative spirit so much needed under the concept of
federalism embodied in the Act. 71
Although the foregoing incentives may insure that I/M programs
will be more faithfully accepted, there is always the prospect that such
proposals may not succeed completely. It cannot be denied, for example,
that sometimes human behavior is unpredictable. 72 Much of the under-
pinning for the incentive proposals is predicated on it being predictable
that positive environmental action will result from offering favorable
70. Again, a definitional problem exists in distinguishing "disincentives" from "in-
centives." What this author would describe as disincentives to compliance-a threatened
loss of highway or sewage treatment funds and/or a ban on the construction of major
stationary sources-have been frequently referred to by courts as "incentives" or "carrots"
to induce performance. See, e.g., Ostrov, supra note 15, at 149 ("While providing states
with a 'carrot' in the form of more time to achieve acceptable air quality .... ");
Connecticut Fund for the Envlt. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1008 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub.
nom, 459 U.S. 1035, 103 S. Ct. 445 (1982), (paraphrasing S. Rep. No. 95-127, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977) ("[C]onstruction ban thus not only provides incentives for
states to adopt the route Congress believed would lead to success .... "); Pacific Legal
Found. v. Costle, 627 F.2d 917, 918 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914, 101 S.
Ct. 1354 (1981); United States v. Ohio Dept. of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1203
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 929, 101 S. Ct. 2031 (1981) ("should be noted
that the various mechanisms provided to induce voluntary State implementation of approved
or promulgated measures, such as cut-offs of highway funds for failure to implement
such measures."); and New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. at 437
(Incorporates "the traditional 'carrot and stick' philosophy by creating incentives for
effective state and local planning to protect public health while still permitting industrial
and commercial growth."). But, according to this writer's common understanding, these
are disincentives rather than incentives or positive inducements for compliance with the
I/M provisions of the Act. Stated differently, such provisions are simply "sticks" aimed
at bringing about compliance and lack any of the essential attributes of positive incentives.
71. In this proposed turnaround, the distinguishing feature is that states receive an
additional reward for engaging in favorable behavior. This is commonly referred to as a
positive incentive to perform and is probably more palatable to states and their residents.
72. For example, it may be rational for an individual to behave in a certain manner
and yet, for whatever reasons, that individual may elect to pursue a different course of
action. This phenomenon undermines the notion of many microeconomists, for example,
that the conduct of human beings is rational and thus predictable. See, e.g., Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, I J. Legal Stud. 29, 32 (1972).
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incentives; but it is conceivable that some individuals or entities may
be offered a "carrot" and still decide that an I/M program is not
palatable. If this happens, what then?
If all else fails, the federal government might seriously consider
operating the I/M program." Of course, this suggestion raises a host
of potential issues. Questions of federalism and practical politics are
likely to accompany such a bold federal initiative. 74
Regarding the federalism issue, the apposite question is whether the
federal government's assumption of control over an I/M program would
be an intrusion into matters of traditional state sovereignty in violation
of the Tenth Amendment." To be sure, such analysis must involve a
discussion of the landmark case in the area, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,'6 in conjunction with the cooperative
federalism principle underlying the Act.
To appreciate Garcia, one must understand the case that it over-
turned, National League of Cities v. Usery.17 In National League of
Cities, a 1974 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
removed all previous exemptions for state and local government em-
ployees pertaining to overtime and minimum wage, was challenged. 71
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court stated that the wage and
hour regulations impermissibly interfered with integral functions of state
and local governments.79 Moreover, according to the Court, states stand
on a different footing than an individual or corporation when challenging
Congress' power to regulate commerce.80 The generally consistent reaction
to National League of Cities was that the Court had breathed new life
73. To support this contention, an analogy can be drawn to § 110 of the Act which
authorizes EPA to promulgate an SIP whenever a state fails to do one that will attain
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for a criteria air pollutant. This
procedure typifies that the ultimate responsibility for insuring compliance with the Act
rests with the federal government. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 896 ("Congress has
placed the responsibility for enforcing the Act on the EPA.") and Train v. Nat'l Resources
Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 87, 95 S. Ct. 1470, 1485 (1975) ("[T]he Agency is charged
with administration of the Act.").
74. For a discussion of these two salient issues, see infra notes 75-89.
75. The question of the extent, if any, that the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution
limits federal power has been an abiding source of interest for years. See, J. Nowak, R.
Rotunda and J. Young, Constitutional Law § 4.10 (3d ed. 1986), for a thorough discussion
of the evolution of this issue. See also R. Rotunda, J. Nowak and J. Young, Treatise
on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 4.10 (1986).
76. 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
77. 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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into the Tenth Amendment which, until this point, was not considered
to pose any significant constitutional limitation on federal power."1
Almost a decade later, Garcia was decided by the Court, and it
involved issues strikingly similar to National League of Cities. The City
of San Antonio owned and operated a mass transit system; the federal
district court found that this was a traditional governmental function.
Therefore, according to National League of Cities, the city was exempt
from the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act . 2 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and subsequently overruled National League of
Cities, holding that their decision in that case was unworkable and
inconsistent with the principles on which the case was supposedly based.
The primary rationale of the Court was that interests of state sovereignty
are more properly protected by the political process than by judicially
created limitations on federal power. 3 Thus, one reading of Garcia is
that the Court virtually eliminated the Tenth Amendment as a restriction
on federal power. s4 If this is a reasonable interpretation of Garcia, it
would seem permissible for the federal government to take control of
and operate the I/M programs in response to uncooperative behavior
by state and local governments.
The argument for such federal action is perhaps bolstered by the
federalism concept embodied within the Act. Under the concept of
cooperative federalism contained within the Act, both the federal gov-
ernment and the states play vital roles in making clean air a reality
within the United States."' The federal government, through the EPA,
establishes primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards to protect the public health and welfare.16 The states, through
State Implementation Plans (SIPs), formulate the strategy to attain such
standards subject to the ultimate approval of the EPA in view of the
requirements of the Act. 7 Thus, the ultimate responsibility for insuring
attainment of national pollution standards falls on the federal govern-
81. See, e.g., Heldt, The Tenth Amendment Iceberg, 30 Hastings L.J. 1763 (1979);
Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty
Redivivus, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1115 (1978); Percy, National League of Cities v. Usery:
The Tenth Amendment Is Alive and Doifig Well, 51 Tul. L. Rev. 95 (1976).
82. 469 U.S. 528, 532, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1007 (1985).
83. Id. at 551, 105 S. Ct. at 1017.
84. See La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 577 (1985) ("[Plower
of judicial review to limit national incursions on state autonomy should be exercised only
in rare circumstances.") and Comment, State Autonomy After Garcia: Will the Political
Process Protect States' Interests?, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1527 (1986) (Commentator argues
political process is insufficient restraint on commerce power.).
85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-10 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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ment. As such, the federal governmental should have the power to
manage a pollution control device-an I/M program-if it is necessary
to make reasonable progress toward attainment of National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for critical pollutants like carbon monoxide and
ozone."8 This would surely seem to be the case when state and/or local
authorities refuse to implement such programs. 9
Although no constitutional limitations on federal power necessarily
preclude the foregoing action, the political ramifications attending it
may be undesirable. One must consider the political damage that might
occur were the federal government not only to mandate I/M programs
but actually to implement them, a function traditionally within the
bailiwick of states. 9° The political fallout of such an action may actually
be counterproductive to the goals of the Act. Thus, it may be impolitic
to consider seriously this alternative enforcement mechanism; at the very
least, the "informal" political process would probably thwart this kind
of federal intrusion to promote I/M programs. 91 Moreover, such action
seems to belie the "carrot" approach, which goes to the heart of the
proposal advanced in this Article. As a matter of fact, this type of
intrusive activity may constitute the quintessential heavy-handed assertion
of federal power. Consequently, this "stick" would probably be inef-
fective in making I/M programs useful tools to attain national standards
for clean air.
88. Although this fundamental federal power may exist, the question of the propriety
of exercising it remains a thorny issue. (For a more detailed discussion of this latter
question, see infra notes 90-91.)
89. See Note, supra note 1, at 880 ("[Sluggested that federal legislation prior to 1970
failed because of both an inability and an unwillingness on the part of the states to deal
with air pollution."). To be sure, this noncooperative attitude has stymied the I/M
program. Hence, federal power should be available to avoid the inertia produced by such
recalcitrance. See United States v. Ohio Dept. of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1202
(6th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 929, 101 S. Ct. 2031 (1981) ("Most preferably,
the State may agree voluntarily to implement and enforce the I/M program. Other options
include ... if feasible, providing for Federal implementation and enforcement of the
program (including Federal licensing of private I/M centers, or turnkey operations, and
imposing Federal inspection fees).").
90. It is conceivable that such action would constitute the ultimate federal intrusion
upon state sovereignty. As such, the specter of massive resentment from state legislators
and residents would loom higher than ever before. Certainly, this has been the transcendent
issue in those school desegregation cases where federal military officials have been inter-
posed to facilitate the desegregation process. See, e.g., U.S. Takes Over Arkansas Guard,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 24, 1957, at 1.
91. Because environmental law is intensely political, the likelihood of such a bold
federal initiative successfully surviving in this climate is slim. See Futrell, Hazardous
Wastes and Toxic Substances: Lessons from Superfund, RCRA; and Other Environmental
Laws, 24 Hous. L. Rev. 125, 128 (1987) and Sive, Forward: Roles and Rules in Envi-
ronmental Decisionmaking, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 637, 640 (1977) (both commentators alluding
to the highly political nature of environmental law).
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Another possible federal action which would facilitate this process
would be to approach directly the local governmental unit, if such is
amenable to constructive action. This solution would work particularly
well in those instances in which the state legislature has enacted legislation
prohibiting the implementation of I/M programs. 92 Query: Can the
federal government negotiate a settlement with the local governmental
unit despite a state statutory prohibition?
Although there is very little jurisprudence on this issue, Lawrence
County v. Lead-Deadwood School District,93 a seldom cited Supreme
Court decision, may shed some light on the matter. Lawrence County
dealt with the conflict between federal and state law over distribution
of federal payments in lieu of taxes: state law required that funds be
distributed in the same manner as general tax revenues while federal
law allowed the local unit to use the funds "for any legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose." 94 In resolving the issue, the Court concluded that
the federal law preempted state law, and the local governmental unit
was obligated to comply with that law notwithstanding the state mandate
to the contrary.95
In the context of this Article, what significance might Lawrence
County have? Perhaps it illustrates that the federal government (most
likely the EPA) can work out an agreement with a compliant local
governmental unit to effectuate an I/M program in defiance of a state
statute or directive.9 6 But, because Lawrence County has been infre-
quently cited and may be limited to its peculiar facts, the question of
whether Congress may require or directly fund a local program which
has been prohibited by state statute admittedly remains unanswered. 97
Assuming Congress can permissibly engage in such activity, here
again, the political conseqtiences may be too ominous to risk it.9s Is it
conceivable, for example, that a local government would hazard adverse
92. A variety of issues arise from this proposed action, including profound federalism
questions.
93. 469 U.S. 256, 105 S. Ct. 695 (1985).
94. Id. at 260, 105 S. Ct. at 697.
95. Id. at 258, 105 S. Ct. at 696.
96. The obvious advantage of such an arrangement is that it allows the federal
government to engage in meaningful efforts to further the I/M problem at the local
government level notwithstanding resistance arising at the state level. Again, a distinct
disadvantage, from a practical sense, is the political upheaval that could be spawned by
such actions.
97. Cf. Note, supra note 1, at 891 (Maintaining that SIP approved by EPA but later
"invalidated" by state courts "on state grounds remains enforceable" as "federal law.").
By analogy, federal action in requiring or funding a local program should take precedence
over a contrary state statute.
98. Again, political considerations remain an important factor because of the nature
of environmental decisionmaking. See supra note 91.
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political repercussions for conducting an I/M program contrary to the
wishes of the state? What about the numerous instances in which a
local government with such maverick leanings might be later subjected
to retaliation by the state?99 Considering these posibilities, a local gov-
ernmental unit may be loath to enter into such a compact with the
federal government.
Even if the local governmental unit were willing to enter into such
an agreement, the concomitant political costs would still have to be
considered. For example, a tremendous outpouring of indignation could
be generated at the state and various local governmental levels because
of some perceived "breach of faith;" this could entail mammoth political
problems that would hinder, rather than further, the I/M program2 °°
Quite frankly, it is almost unimaginable that such a "divide and con-
quer" policy would have a realistic chance of succeeding on such a
volatile issue.
The political risks, to be sure, would probably be even greater if
the federal government attempted to order a local governmental unit to
implement an I/M program, assuming, once again, that such action falls
within the pale of permissible federal power. 01 Nothing may epitomize
the "stick" approach more than this type of federal action. It is the
stuff of which resistance is born. As a result, there is very little to
commend this approach as a means of galvanizing compliance with I/
M requirements. Here again, an incentive approach seems preferable to
any approach grounded on compulsion.
C. The Execution of the Game Plan
Although it is important to formulate a concept or plan for a
palatable I/M program, its execution is perhaps just as vital. For ex-
ample, it is at this point in the process that ideas are crystallized to
give substance and form to an otherwise theoretical model. Thus, ex-
ecution assumes an aura of importance because, without it, inertia is a
distinct possibility regardless of the quality of the abstract ideas. 0 2 But,
99. For example, a reduction or termination of state funds to support vital local
services such as public schools, sanitation facilities, and the like, may be distinct possi-
bilities.
100. Because a local governmental unit does not operate within a vacuum, it is certainly
dependent upon, to some degree, the existence of a cooperative relationship with the state
governmental unit and perhaps, to a lesser extent, with other local governmental coun-
terparts.
101. This quintessential powerplay is likely to engender nothing short of a political
revolt.
102. A satisfactory execution scheme is particularly vital in an I/M program because
of the disfavor such programs frequently encounter. An agreeable plan of execution can
at least assuage this public discontent.
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as luck would have it, implementation is exceedingly difficult to achieve
in a meaningful way.
The implementation of the game plan should further the following
objectives: 1) that the federal government and the states should essentially
retain the cooperative federalism relationship originally created in the
Act; and 2) that the process of implementation should, congruent with
the plan, make state and local officials and citizens feel good about
complying with the I/M program. 03 Again, this is consistent with the
theme that positive behavioral responses are evoked when incentives are
used to stimulate performance, as opposed to the utilization of negative
stimuli which tend to engender reactions that run counter to the goals
of the Act."°
The concept of cooperative federalism is an extremely attractive
implementation tool. To the extent that both the federal government
and the states share in the responsibility of attaining and maintaining
national ambient standards, success is more probable. 05 A qualification
to this principle may arise, however, when one or both of the parties
fails to cooperate. Regarding I/M programs, for instance, a major
problem in the implementation phase has been the lack of cooperation
by states.' °6 Thus, an implementation plan that obviates this problem
has some realistic chance of success.
Implementing the notion of shared responsibility can certainly be
facilitated by a package of economic incentives.'0 7 This proposal calls
for Congress to make better use of market and non-market incentives
in the implementation of I/M provisions. Moreover, any disincentives
currently included in the Act should be restructured so as to constitute
performance incentives. 08 Again, any governmental official or entity
103. The "feel good" concept is inherent in the overall behavioral goal of inspiring
people to do as they believe. At a time, therefore, when a majority of the public is
espousing the view that economic growth should be subordinated to environmental pro-
tection, it is exceedingly important to make it easier for "people to put their money
where their mouths are." Portney, supra note 69, at 74.
104. A graphic illustration of this principle is the less than satisfactory results involving
I/M programs accomplished through the "stick" method of inducing compliance. See 42
U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 1986).
105. To Congress' credit, the Act does reflect the heartfelt belief that a federal-state
cooperative effort is necessary to attain the primary and secondary National Ambient Air
Quality Standards. This recognizes that air pollution must be effectively addressed at both
the national and local level. History supports this in view of the deficiencies extant when
air pollution control was the sole responsibility of the states. See Stewart, supra note 26,
at 1196.
106. As previously noted, the cooperative federalism concept does not function well
when one partner (most commonly the state) fails to cooperate. Id.
107. Economic incentives are integral components of the shared responsibility concept
because of the role they can play in enticing cooperative behavior.
108. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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espousing the sanctity of clean air will have little justifiable reason to
resist complying with an I/M program in the face of a possible reward
for such compliance. As noted, "oftentimes people's words are better
than their deeds."' 9 An incentive program of this nature can foster the
necessary linkage between lofty words and actual deeds and thus make
it easier for people to actually do what they profess to believe. This
nexus between attitude and behavior, although difficult to correlate, can
serve a face-saving function for some individuals because, as pointed
out in an ancient saying, "[a] superior man is ashamed if his words
are better than his deeds." 110
The theory that incentives make it palatable for one to act in
uniformity with his or her beliefs probably holds particularly true in
regards to those individuals residing in nonattainment areas. In such
areas, one may readily champion clean air in the abstract, but find it
difficult to bring his or her behavior in line with these words because
of the perceived negative costs associated with environmental require-
ments of I/M programs."' The inability to establish some consistency
between the actor's beliefs and his or her behavior concerning clean air
is exacerbated when his or her attitude is adversely affected by the
"stick" method of enforcement. In such cases, an individual's actions
may simply be a product of his or her current situation and not reflect
any enduring attitudes." 1 2
The principal objective of the incentives package proposed in this
Article is to create a setting that increases the likelihood that a durable,
environmentally cognizant attitude will be transformed into comparable
deeds. That is, placing an individual in supportive surroundings should
greatly enhance the probability that he or she will actually act in harmony
with his or her beliefs. Certainly, the affected individual should feel
better about complying with I/M requirements when there is an incentive
for doing so. Given this, the notion of "doing what one believes"
should assume a greater degree of validity."'
To illustrate graphically why the foregoing regulatory method is
probably superior to the one currently embodied in the Act, Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania,"4 a case epit-
109. Snyder, supra note 69, at 105.
110. Id. (statement attributed to Confucius (circa 500 B.C.)).
111. In such nonattainment areas, residents have to be actually willing to sacrifice
economic benefits for environmental improvement; thus, it becomes more difficult "to
support environmental positions." Portney, supra note 69, at 74.
112. Snyder, supra note 69, at 110-11.
113. One would seemingly be predisposed to bringing his or her conduct in line with
espoused beliefs when a reward or incentive makes such behavior easier to engage in.
But see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
114. 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1982). This is the citation for the seminal case in
this tortuous litigation. There are fourteen other related actions.
19891 1337
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
omizing the untoward consequences of such existing regulations, has
been singled out for analysis. This case represents litigation spanning a
number of years with concomitantly huge transaction costs." 5 During
this period, very little was actually accomplished toward advancing the
principal objective of the I/M program, namely a reduction in harmful
emissions from in-use vehicles.1 6 A step-by-step examination of this
tortuous litigation reveals what perhaps should never be done with respect
to the I/M program.
The Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air saga began as
early as 1982. In a proceeding in a federal district court in Pennsylvania,
the state of Pennsylvania moved for a stay and modification of a consent
decree which had been entered into by the state and two of its admin-
istrative agencies with the United States and the Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council in 1978.117 The purpose of this consent decree was to establish
an I/M program. In 1981, however, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
had passed a statute (HB 456) prohibiting expenditure of public funds
for the I/M program. " s
The federal district court held that Pennsylvania was not entitled
to a modification of the consent decree because the changed circumstance
that would otherwise give rise to a modification was of Pennsylvania's
own doing, namely prohibiting spending for the I/M program by stat-
utory mandate." 9 Moreover, in ancillary rulings, the court held: 1) that
it need not defer to EPA for administrative remedies before deciding
issues of contempt and unconstitutionality raised by the Pennsylvania
General Assembly's action prohibiting spending on the I/M program;
2) that, on the facts presented to it, it lacked the authority under the
federalist system to countermand the decision of a state legislature not
to expend state funds on the establishment of an I/M program; 3) that
the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution restricted the
reach of the Commerce Clause and acted as a bar to declaring HB 456
unconstitutional; 4) that state agencies were in contempt for failing to
115. The magnitude of the transaction costs, especially those pertaining to attorney's
fees, is demonstrated by the attorney's fees requests stemming from the litany of actions
under the style of Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986), rev'd, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987) ("$30,000
for attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to the entry of the consent decree" and a
total fee for Phases -IX of $205,433).
116. As a result of the defiant behavior of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, very
little, if anything, was done regarding reducing automobile emissions via I/M programs.
Nonattainment in the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh areas remained intact, for example,
during this protracted litigation.
117. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council For Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F.
Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
118. Id. at 875.
119. Id. at 884.
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comply with the consent decree; and 5) that the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the Secretaries of Transportation and Environmental
Resources were also in civil contempt and thus the United States De-
partment of Transportation was enjoined from awarding certain trans-
portation grants, unless specified conditions were met.
20
In a subsequent decision (slightly less than a month later), the federal
district court again entertained a Pennsylvania motion for a stay of
sanctions pending appeal of the previously rendered decision; this motion
was denied.' 21
The seminal action in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
was brought by several Pennsylvania legislators. These legislators sought
to intervene in the original case nearly four years after the actions were
originally filed and twenty months after entry of the consent decree.
Intervention was sought as of right, or with the court's permission, on
the ground that the decree deprived the intervenors of their right as
legislators to debate and vote on whether Pennsylvania should establish
an I/M program. 22 The district court had earlier denied the motion to
intervene as untimely. 23
On appeal, the Third Circuit held: 1) that, although the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Air Act confers a right to intervene to enforce
the law, it does not give a right to intervene on behalf of an alleged
violator or to intervene to seek to prevent enforcement; and 2) that the
interests of the legislators were adequately represented by the state.
24
The litigation continued when the Third Circuit rendered its first
substantive decision concerning the consent decree. 25 In this phase of
the litigation, Pennsylvania challenged three orders entered by the federal
district court in relation to the consent decree: 1) denial of a request
by Pennsylvania for a 20 month extension of the deadline for the
implementation of the I/M program; 2) modification of the consent
decree to require monthly state audits of emissions inspection stations,
the establishment of two "referee" stations to handle consumer com-
plaints, and the certification by Pennsylvania of at least 3,000 inspection
stations by May 1, 1982; and 3) refusal of the Pennsylvania request for
the reconsideration of order number two. 26 The Court of Appeals for
120. Id.
121. Id. at 885.
122. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 970
(3d Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 972, citing Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania,
No. 76-2068 (E.D. Pa. March 25, 1981).
124. Id. at 973.
125. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 976
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905, 103 S. Ct. 206 (1982).
126. Id. at 977.
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the Third Circuit concluded that the federal district court had properly
exercised its discretion in all three of the orders and affirmed the
challenged portions of the consent decree.1 27
The long and costly path of litigation then returned to the federal
district court. At this point, Pennsylvania sought federal dollars under
the safety and air quality exceptions to the federal sanctions imposed
for noncompliance with the I/M program.12 2 The district court, carefully
applying the law to the facts, ruled that those projects which were
primarily for safety purposes-new markings to replace faded paint
markings, the only purpose of which was to provide guidance for drivers-
would receive funding under the exceptions listed in the sanction order.1 29
Those projects, however, which were not primarily for safety (bridge
repair, modernization, new construction) would not receive funding.3 0
The focus of the litigation then shifted to the Pennsylvania state
courts. In Burd v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, 3' some
members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly brought actions for a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation from implementing an I/M program. A
curious twist to this action was that legislators were asking the court
to prohibit the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation from im-
plementing an I/M program when the Department was then under a
federal district court contempt order for failure to implement that same
program.
Realizing the countervailing positions involved, the state court arrived
at a common sense resolution of the issue and held that, notwithstanding
the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the operation of an I/M program,
there were indeed other provisions of the Pennsylvania Code that did
authorize the Department of Transportation to operate an I/M pro-
gram.3 2 Thus, the motion for summary judgment was denied.
The members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly appealed the
state court finding that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
had authority to operate the I/M program. Interestingly, while the appeal
was pending, the legislature passed legislation that would allow an I/
M program, if failure to have a program would result in loss of federal
funds. 33
127. Id. at 987.
128. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 551 F. Supp.
827 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The pertinent provision of the Act giving rise to this exception is
42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
129. Id. at 831.
130. Id. at 831.
131. 66 Pa. Commw. 129, 443 A.2d 1197 (1982).
132. Id. at 132, 443 A.2d at 1200.
133. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4706(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988), as amended, 1983 Pa.
Laws 4, No. 3 § I.
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In view of this significant change in circumstances, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the Pennsylvania Department of Trans-
portation had no statutory authority to implement an I/M program at
the time it entered into the consent decree, so that the purported decree
was void. 34 Moreover, the court concluded that the subsequently enacted
legislation permitting the I/M program in Pennsylvania did not retro-
actively validate the Department of Transportation's consent to the
agreement.' 35 Thus, an injunction was issued precluding Pennsylvania
from performing the terms and conditions of the consent decree.
In the face of a scathing dissent, a question arises concerning the
effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision upon the very core
of this long and drawn out litigation-the consent decree. To be sure,
the dissent's contention that the federal district court's actions were not
against Pennsylvania governmental departments as separate entities, but
as arms of the state, makes eminently good sense.'3 6 Thus, in the opinion
of one dissenting judge, the state of Pennsylvania (as a whole) always
had the authority to implement the I/M program. 3 7
The litigation spiral then shifted from the substantive arena to the
thorny issue of attorney's fees. It is easy to imagine the tremendous
level of court costs, including attorney's fees, attending such protracted
litigation. As could be expected, the citizens group involved in the
litigation, Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, sued for
attorney's fees and costs under the Clean Air Act, for all activity after
the consent decree was issued on August 29, 1978.
In the first of many different adjudications of the issue, the federal
district court awarded the group compensation based on the degree of
skill required for a particular task. The court first arrived at the "lode-
star" figure, which was then capable of being adjusted, based on the
contingent nature of the case, the quality of the work performed, and
the results obtained.138
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the attorney's fees litigation resulted
in an affirmance in part and a reversal in part. The court of appeals
affirmed that portion of the district decision holding that attorney's fees
may be awarded for time spent by counsel participating in regulatory
134. Scanlon v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transp., 502 Pa. 577, 590, 467 A.2d 1108,
1114 (1983).
135. Id. at 590, 467 A.2d at 1114.
136. Id. at 595, 467 A.2d at 1117.
137. Id. The Scanlon decision was eviscerated in Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 755 F.2d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
819, 106 S. Ct. 67 (1985) ("IFlinal federal court judgment based on federal law cannot
be collaterally attacked by a state court . . ").
138. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 581 F. Supp.
1412, 1431 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (Subsequent case treatment infra note 139.).
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proceedings. However, it held that the lower court erred by increasing
the fee award on the basis of the superior quality of counsel's per-
formance. In addition, the Third Circuit deferred decision, pending
reargument, on the question of the propriety of a multiplier to the
lodestar amount based on the risk of loss incurred by counsel in un-
dertaking the litigation.3 9
The attorney's fees question finally worked its way to the United
States Supreme Court. The Court made a significant contribution to
the body of law in this area by holding that generally the lodestar
amount need not be adjusted upward for superior performance except
in truly extraordinary circumstances.' 40 As to normal superior perform-
ance, the Court felt that such an adjustment would be a windfall for
the prevailing attorney because the prevailing attorney's success is pri-
marily attributable to skill, experience, and hard work. Coincidentally,
these are the same factors normally considered by a court in determining
the reasonable number of hours and reasonable hourly rate for the
lodestar.' 4' Pursuant to reargument, the Court later held that the lodestar
amount could not be routinely adjusted to account for risk of loss. The
apparent explanation for this limitation is that risk of loss is always
inherent in litigation. 42 The upshot of this decision, although difficult
to determine accurately in either a theoretical or practical sense, is that
normally a prevailing party will be limited to the lodestar amount. The
possible policy argument militating against this holding is that lawyers
may be dissuaded from undertaking such complex, tedious, and costly
litigation because of the absence of any prospect of recovery beyond
the lodestar. 43
The difficulty in applying the Supreme Court decision concerning
the computation of attorney's fees of a prevailing party has been evident
139. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272
(3d Cir.), aff'd in part and reversed in part, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986), rev'd
on reh'g sub. nom. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483
U.S. 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
140. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 475 U.S.
546, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986) and Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
141. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. at 546, 106 S. Ct. at
3089 ("[T]he lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors comprising
a 'reasonable' attorney's fee, and it is unnecessary to enhance the fee for superior
performance.").
142. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
107 S. Ct. 3078 (1978) ("Before adjusting for risk assumption, there should be evidence
in the record, and the trial court should so find, that without risk-enhancement, plaintiff
would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant
market.").
143. As a corollary, counsel may find it difficult to expend the requisite time and
effort in such cases because of the prospect of limited recompense.
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when lower courts have subsequently tried to act consistently with the
dictates of the Court's opinion. For instance, Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania is still languishing in the lower
federal courts because of the attorney's fees issue.'"
The foregoing concatenation of litigative events has nothing to com-
mend it. It was cumbersome, costly, tedious, and, most importantly,
counterproductive in terms of bringing about desired environmental ob-
jectives. In these cognate cases, the continuous recalcitrance of the
Pennsylvania General Assembly over a number of years reflects the
tremendous potential for disruptive behavior inherent in the "stick"
method. 4 To be sure, during this protracted litigation in both federal
and state courts, very little was done to reduce nitrogen oxides, hydro-
carbons, and carbon monoxide emissions from in-use vehicles. Instead,
a confusing collection of legal decisions was generated by this maze of
judicial holdings, which provides little comfort for the environmental
concerns justifying I/M programs. 46
In summary, the Pennsylvania experience reflects the most unima-
ginably defiant attitude toward I/M programs; the threat of sanctions
embodied in the Act probably did more to foster this behavior than to
eliminate it.1 7 More importantly, the Pennsylvania experience signals
that a new approach to behavior modification within the American
populace is essential if I/M is to play an important role in achieving
air quality that meets the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. An
approach which engenders greater cooperation among federal and state
authorities must, therefore, receive serious consideration if clean air is
to become a reality.
D. Policy Objectives Advanced by the Plan
If a system of economic incentives concerning the I/M program had
been operational during the lengthy Pennsylvania litigation, what would
144. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 826
F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1987).
145. Who is to say that members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly would not
have been more responsive to the dictates of the consent decree had a "carrot" been
extended to them. At the very least, a favorable reward would have been available upon
compliance, the prospect of which may have been the impetus for favorable action.
146. The environmental concerns associated with the I/M program are primarily the
reduction of harmful emissions from in-service vehicles which will lead to reasonable
further progress toward attainment of national primary and secondary standards. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869, 873 n.2 (E.D.
Pa. 1982).
147. To hit someone over the head with a stick can lead to a more defiant attitude
because of the natural tendency that such conduct will rile someone. As it has been
noted, "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." 0.
Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1881).
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have been the likely result? What would have been the reaction of the
Pennsylvania General Assembly if members of the general public as well
as the state had been offered economic inducements to implement an
I/M program? Would their attitudes about clean air have been trans-
formed into parallel deeds, namely the volitional acts of getting their
automobiles inspected and tested and perhaps repaired to insure the
proper functioning of the emissions control systems?
Of course, it is difficult, if not impossible, to forecast accurately
the answers to the foregoing questions. But one can surmise that an
altogether different situation might have ensued. For instance, a package
of incentives to either the state of Pennsylvania or its residents would
probably have quelled any significant resistance to such a program. 4
As a result, the Pennsylvania General Assembly would have probably
felt the popular political pulse and, in all likelihood, would have pre-
sented considerably less, and perhaps no, resistance to the I/M pro-
gram.14 9 Just think of the time and resources that could have been saved
and thus allocated to other purposes in the absence of such defiance.
More significantly, environmental benefits with regard to automobile
emissions pollution could have been realized instead of the environmental
costs suffered during the hiatus created by the litigation.5 0
In terms of the overall environmental policy objectives that may be
realized from the establishment of such friendly, political relations among
these key players, some significant movement toward the attainment and
maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards with regard to
carbon monoxide and ozone is the most noteworthy. To be sure, this
could assuage the air quality problems that plague a number of air
quality control regions today.' Moreover, the political shell game that
surrounds the current clean air policy regarding extensions for compliance
could be avoided.'5 2
148. When one feels good about what he or she is doing, there is less likelihood that
there will be any meaningful resistance to doing it. Cf. Youngs, Pattern of Threat and
Punishment Reciprocity in a Conflict Setting, 51 J. of Personality and Soc. Psychology
541 (1986) ("Numerous studies suggest that the use of threats and punishments in a
conflict setting can trigger the development of conflict spirals .... ").
149. State legislatures are notoriously political bodies whose ability to respond to
political impulses with alacrity is well-documented. See, e.g., the Illinois General Assembly's
rapid approval of funding for a new ballpark for the Chicago White Sox during the 1988
session. 1988 Il. Laws 85-1034, 1988 I11. Legis. Serv. 204 (West).
150. See supra notes 114-147 and accompanying text.
151. See Some Building Banned in Los Angeles Area to fight Air Pollution, The
Louisville Courier-Journal, Aug. 30, 1988, at 1.
152. A pivotal question now is what happens after the arrival of August 31, 1988,
the current moratorium date for compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for carbon monoxide and ozone. But see EPA Plans to Resume Clean Air
Crackdown in Atlanta, Elsewhere, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Aug. 30, 1988,
at A3, where the possible post-moratorium activities of EPA are discussed.
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An ancillary benefit of this rapprochement is that a positive envi-
ronmental ethic may be instilled within the population, thus facilitating
the phenomenon of matching up attitudinal declarations with behavior.
It will certainly ease the administrative burden of implementing and
enforcing I/M requirements if people are willing to behave as they
believe.' The venerable concept of individual autonomy will be furthered
while environmental objectives will be advanced, which is the best of
both worlds.
Another added advantage of establishing good relations between the
federal government and the states from an incentive-focused I/M pro-
gram relates to economics. Pundits of I/M programs have often been
critical of the unnecessary costs associated with them. 5 4 This criticism
has intensified with the advent of more sophisticated technology in recent
automobile models where it is argued that the warranty provisions as-
sociated with such state of the art emission control devices provide ample
protection against the malfunction of such devices, thus obviating the
need for I/M programs."' From an economics perspective, a cogent
argument is that the consumer already pays once for environmental
control when he or she purchases the automobile along with the emission
control system warranty and, therefore, should not have to pay again
via the cost of an I/M program. 1 6
But does existing emission control technology, coupled with the
apposite warranty provisions, provide sufficient environmental protection
from emissions of nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and carbon monoxide
by in-service vehicles? Probably not, absent an effective monitoring
process to determine whether there is an actual malfunction in the
automobile emission control system. How would anyone know if the
warranty provisions pertaining to the emission control devices had been
breached without some detection mechanism? At this point, the practical
utility of I/M programs becomes apparent. They can serve a monitoring
or detection function, and this should justify their additional costs. In
other words, the environmental benefits associated with detecting and
correcting automobile emissions which violate the national standards
with regard to critical air pollutants appear to outweigh the economic
costs attending an I/M program. Thus, under traditional microeconomic
analysis, such programs appear to be economically efficient.'17
153. For example, the costs associated with enforcement actions and litigation could
be greatly reduced if the states and citizens were more obsequious in their behavior
regarding 1/M programs.
154. See, e.g., Reitze, supra note 9, at 705.
155. Id. at 710.
156. Id. But this argument fails to consider the fact that I/M programs may be
necessary to ensure emission control system is conforming to the applicable warranty.
157. See Kaldor-Hicks Theoreom, where efficiency is defined in terms of the aggregative
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Political, economic, and social policy considerations are always in-
tertwined with environmental decision making."' The issues surrounding
the propriety of I/M programs are consistent with this general theme.
Politically, an I/M program driven by a "carrot" or incentive approach
in contrast to the existing "stick" approach would be more palatable
to the legislators and residents of the various states. In this instance,
it is less likely that affected persons will perceive that they are being
subjected to unwarranted intimidation to promote compliance; instead,
the rewards or incentives encouraging performance make it politically
palatable to submit freely to the program. 5 9
Economically, an I/M program is a boon because it can eliminate
to some degree the problem of externalities which is commonly referred
to as pollution in environmental law.16° To the extent that air pollution
stemming from nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and
ozone is curtailed, a more efficient result is likely to ensue because we
eliminate the problem of externalities to some degree and also stimulate
the provision of a public good, namely clean air.1 61 Moreover, under
the Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency, the aggregative benefits of I/
M programs appear to outweigh the aggregative costs, thus suggesting
the efficiency of such programs in this sense as well. 62
Socially, the incentive-based I/M program offers the prospect of
changing the entire manner in which the federal government implements
and enforces statutory and regulatory environmental requirements. 63
Changing the social phenomenon in which the majority of people espouse
things which they do not really subscribe to presents a significant chal-
lenge. If people actually adopt the ethic of doing as they believe,
environmental values in general will be enhanced; more importantly, a
far greater acceptance of the I/M program will probably occur and will
naturally increase the likelihood of reaching and maintaining national
ambient standards in a far greater number of air quality control regions.
The incentive-based regulatory proposal advanced in this Article is
designed to enhance ambient air quality in a politically, economically,
benefits of an activity outweighing the aggregative costs. See generally, Hicks, The Ec-
onomics of John Hicks 12 (1984).
158. Gates, supra note 11, at 40, 41.
159. Overcoming political resistance to the I/M program enhances the likelihood of
more ready acceptance. See Reitze, supra note 9, at 720.
160. See R. Findley and D. Farber, Environmental Law In a Nutshell 117 (2d ed.
1988) ("Pollution is a common form of external cost ....").
161. R. Findley and D. Farber, Cases and Materials, supra note 66, at 346.
162. It is unclear whether Pareto efficiency (the "80/20 rule" is attributed to Italian
economist Vifredo Pareto, 1848-1923) applies here. But perhaps it does because no one
is made worse off and someone will actually benefit from the I/M program.
163. This would signal a change from the command and control method to a more
palatable positive incentive approach.
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and socially acceptable fashion. 16 Accomplishing these varied objectives
is no small task. But this novel approach to environmental regulation
is a vast improvement over existing regulatory initiatives. Therefore, the
short-term and long-term goals of such a proposal must be considered.
1. Short-Term Objectives
The use of economic incentives to stimulate popular support for the
I/M program should have immediate short-term benefits. The realization
of such gains is vital because any dramatic change in direction needs
some quick victories to establish its legitimacy. 165
In the case of an I/M program, there must be some readily available
evidence that such a revitalized program will make a difference in
enhancing air quality in those air quality control regions heretofore
plagued by carbon monoxide and ozone pollution.'" Such evidence is
essential to counteract the frequent criticism that no causal connection
between an I/M program and improved air quality has been demonstrated
scientifically. 1 ' Moreover, if this causal nexus is not shown rather early
in the new inspection and maintenance process, vociferous protests about
the undue costs attendant to such programs can be expected.
The preeminent short-term goal is, therefore, to acquire data re-
flecting that a marked improvement in air quality is indeed traceable
to enhanced public participation in the I/M program.' 6" If such data
are available, the I/M process stands to gain politically, economically,
socially, and environmentally. The prompt success of this program and
its processes are essential to obtain the imprimatur of the American
people. And this popular approval will probably avert the recrudescence
164. Here again, satisfaction of the political, economic and social considerations make
the proposal coterminous with policy perspectives governing environmental decisionmaking
generally. See Gates, supra note 11, at 40, 41, and F. Anderson, D. Mandelker, and A.
Tarlock, Envtl. Protection: Law and Policy XXVI (1984).
165. Because people are generally skeptical of change, immediate evidence of the success
of a dramatically different program may mollify the skeptics. To the contrary, the failure
to realize some environmental gains rather quickly could add fuel to the argument that
this additional strain on the United States treasury created by economic incentives is not
worth the meager benefits.
166. For example, dramatic improvements in the air quality of "dirty air" cities like
Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Atlanta and Denver, to name a few, would graphically
demonstrate the efficacy of the economic incentive program.
167. See, e.g., Ostrov, supra note 15, at 152 ("Because I/M is only one means of
achieving the goal of acceptable air quality, states needed a standardized method to
demonstrate emission reductions and consequent air quality improvement.") ("difficult to
develop a correlation between I/M-induced HC reductions and ozone air quality"). Id.
at 190.
168. Id. at 187 ("The question remains, however, whether I/M will be effective for
post-1980 automobiles designed to meet tougher new car standards.").
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of the wasteful litigation exemplified by the litany of cases arising from
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania.169
2. Long-Term Objectives
Once an incentive-based I/M program is embraced by the vast
majority of the American people, attention shifts to the long range
objectives of such programs. The ultimate long-term goal is to reach
that point where there is no longer any need for such programs. This
will only be achieved, of course, upon the universal attainment and.
maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards coupled with
the development of state of the art emission control systems that are
virtually foolproof. Of course, as a practical matter this Elysium may
not be attainable.170
Because the foregoing goal may be well-nigh unachievable, some
less ambitious, but essential, objective should be explored. A more
modest goal consists of three principal objectives: 1) to stimulate the
virtually universal acceptance of the I/M program; 2) to sensitize Amer-
icans to the fact that bringing their behavior concerning the environment
in line with their favorable attitudes will probably make I/M programs
more agreeable to them; and 3) to phase out eventually the need for
an incentives package to promote compliance with an I/M program. To
be sure, these are formidable, yet potentially achievable, objectives.171
But the truly promising aspect of the proposal presented in this Article
is that clean air can be attained and maintained during the period in
which I/M programs are actually used; and yet such programs can be
easily phased out when it becomes apparent that, for whatever reasons,
they are no longer needed to maintain the requisite ambient air quality.172
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress has been loath to use economic incentives to insure com-
pliance with environmental statutes and regulations. Although the ques-
tion of whether this is generally an ill-advised policy perhaps transcends
this Article, it is transparent that such policy is imprudent in connection
169. See supra notes 114-147 and accompanying text for a discussion of this protracted,
perhaps economically inefficient, utilization of judicial resources.
170. "Clean air" may not be a universally attainable objective because the political
will may be lacking in view of the countervailing economic and social policy considerations.
In a Deluge of Problems, Where Are the Worst Threats?, Conservation Foundation Letter,
December 1983.
171. See supra notes 148-164 and accompanying text.
172. Whenever I/M programs should become superfluous because of favorable air
quality, it would be a much deserved boon for the American people to dispense with
this requirement.
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with the I/M program under the Clean Air Act. To be sure, the "stick"
policy has demonstrated its inutility as a regulatory tool for stimulating
prompt, effective compliance. On the other hand, the "carrot" approach
has virtually unlimited potential as a means of fostering a desirable
response to I/M programs within the general population. Hence, this
suggested approach could make such programs more palatable to the
apparently numerous coerced participants within our society.

